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TWO FORMS OF ONE USEFUL LOGIC:
EXISTENTIAL FIXED POINT LOGIC AND
LIBERAL DATALOG
ANDREAS BLASS AND YURI GUREVICH
Abstract. A natural liberalization of Datalog is used in the Dis-
tributed Knowledge Authorization Language (DKAL). We show
that the expressive power of this liberal Datalog is that of existen-
tial fixed-point logic. The exposition is self-contained.
1. Prologue
Existential fixed point logic (EFPL) differs from first-order logic by
prohibiting universal quantification (while allowing existential quan-
tification) and by allowing the “least fixed point” operator for positive
inductive definitions. A precise definition is given below.
Our original motivation for developing EFPL in [1] was its appro-
priateness for formulating pre- and post-conditions in Hoare’s logic of
asserted programs [8]. In particular, the expressivity hypothesis needed
for Cook’s completeness theorem [4] in the context of first-order logic
is automatically satisfied in the context of EFPL.
But it turned out that EFPL has many other interesting properties.
(1) EFPL captures polynomial time computability on the class of
structures of the form {0, 1, . . . , n} with (at least) the successor
relation and names for the endpoints.
(2) The set of logically valid EFPL formulas is a complete recur-
sively enumerable set.
(3) The set of satisfiable EFPL formulas is a complete recursively
enumerable set.
(4) The set of EFPL formulas that hold in all finite structures is a
complete co-r.e. set.
(5) When an EFPL formula is satisfied by a tuple of elements in a
structure, this fact depends on only a finite part of the structure.
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(6) No transfinite iteration is needed when evaluating EFPL for-
mulas, by the natural iterative process, in any structure.1
(7) EFPL can define (given appropriate syntactic apparatus) truth
of EFPL formulas.
(8) Truth of EFPL formulas is preserved by homomorphisms.
(9) If an EFPL formula and a first-order formula are equivalent,
then they are equivalent to an existential2 first-order formula.
Except for (7), which will be proved elsewhere, all these results are
in [1]. The combination of (2) and (3) is surprising; it is possible
because EFPL is not closed under negation. That is also why (7)
doesn’t contradict Tarski’s theorem on undefinability of truth.
Recently, EFPL has found a new application as the logical underpin-
ning of the distributed knowledge authorization language DKAL [6, 7].
For this application, it was useful to recast EFPL in a form that looks
similar to Datalog; it was called liberal Datalog in [7]. The purpose of
the present note is to show exactly how the logic programs of liberal
Datalog correspond to the formulas of traditional EFPL.
2. Introduction
Quisani: Let’s return to existential fixed-point logic. We discussed it
once [2], yet something bothers me about the definition.
Authors:3 Before we get to what’s bothering you, let’s be sure you
have the correct definition from [1].
Q: I think I know the definition all right, but to be safe let me check
it with you: After making the convention that predicate symbols are
classified as positive or negatable, one defines terms and atomic formulas
just as in first-order logic. Compound formulas are built by
• negation, applied only to atomic formulas whose predicate sym-
bol is negatable,
• conjunction and disjunction,
• existential quantification, and
• the LET-THEN construction.
1This means that the closure ordinal of each of the iterations is at most ω, the
first infinite ordinal. Contrast this with what happens when the least fixed point
operator is added to full first-order logic or just to its universal fragment. As shown
in the appendix to [1], arbitrarily large closure ordinals are possible there.
2We could nearly say “existential positive” here. Negative occurrences are needed
in the existential formula only for those predicate symbols that are negative in the
vocabulary of the EFPL formula.
3Not necessarily speaking in unison.
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All but the last of these have their traditional meanings as in first-order
logic. The LET-THEN construction4 produces formulas of the form
LET P1(~x
1)← δ1, . . . , Pk(~x
k)← δk THEN ψ
where the Pi’s are distinct, new, positive predicate symbols and the δi
and ψ are EFPL formulas in the vocabulary expanded by addition of
these Pi’s. Semantically, this formula means to use the δi’s to define
a monotone operator on k-tuples of predicates; given a tuple of (in-
terpretations of) the Pi’s, see which tuples ~x
i satisfy the δi’s, and use
those sets of tuples as the new interpretation of the Pi’s. Repeat this
operation until you reach a fixed point. Finally, use this least fixed
point of the operator to interpret the Pi’s in ψ.
A: That’s right. You tacitly assumed a specific vocabulary Υ when
you said that the Pi’s are new, meaning they’re not in Υ. In other
words, although they occur in the LET-THEN formula you mentioned,
they don’t count as part of the vocabulary of that formula.
Q: Right. I think of them as bound predicate variables. They could,
for example, be renamed without affecting the meaning of the formula
(as long as there are no clashes).
A: Indeed, bound predicate variables are just what the Pi’s become
when the formula is translated into second-order logic (as in Theorem 5
of [1]). That reminds us of another comment about your description
of the semantics. You repeatedly applied the operator defined by the
δi’s, until a fixed point is reached. But the semantics merely requires
the least fixed point; it doesn’t care about its explicit construction.
Q: OK. I guess I was giving a sort of operational semantics, whereas
the logic is defined in a purely denotational way.
But I’ve found it convenient to think about EFPL operationally,
especially when trying to write EFPL formulas to express particular
properties. For example, I once checked that, in the standard model of
arithmetic, N = 〈N, 0, 1,+, ·, <〉, the property of being a prime number
is expressible by an EFPL formula.
A: By Matiyasevich’s solution of Hilbert’s tenth problem, this property
— indeed any recursively enumerable property of natural numbers —
4Other notations are “let . . . in . . . ”and “letrec . . . in . . . .” We retain “then”
mainly for consistency with [1]. “Then” also serves as a reminder that, when
expressed in second-order logic, the contruction amounts to an implication: “If you
interpret the Pi’s in such a way that each Pi is implied by the corresponding δi,
then ψ holds.”
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is expressible in N by an existential first-order formula; you don’t need
the fixed point operator.
Q: I know, but I was looking for a formula that directly expresses
what it means to be prime, without detouring through clever Diophan-
tine tricks. The formula I constructed was actually fairly complicated,
mainly because of the need to simulate two bounded universal quanti-
fiers. A natural definition of “x is prime” is that no u < x divides x
unless u = 1, and a natural definition of “u doesn’t divide x” (as long
as 1 6= u < x) is that there is no v < x such that u · v = x. These are
the two bounded universal quantifications. In [1], you showed5 how to
replace some cases of universal quantification with EFPL descriptions
of searches through the domains of quantification. For example, in the
case of arithmetic, (∀w < x)P (w) can be replaced with
LET Y (u)← u = 0 ∨ ∃w [u = w + 1 ∧ Y (w) ∧ P (w)] THEN Y (x).
I applied this idea, replacing each of the two universal quantifiers in
the definition of “prime” by a search. Here’s what I came up with,
assuming that equality is negatable.
LET Y (u, v)←
u = 0 ∨ ∃w [u = w + 1 ∧ Y (w, v) ∧ (w · v 6= x ∨ w = 1 ∨ w = x)
THEN
LET X(u, v)←
v = 0 ∨ ∃w [v = w + 1 ∧X(u, w) ∧ Y (u, w)]
THEN 1 < x ∧X(x, x).
A: That looks correct. The first LET-clause makes Y (u, v) express “x
is not the product of anything < u with v, except for trivial products
1 ·x and x · 1,” and then the second LET-clause makes X(u, v) express
“x is not a nontrivial product of anything < u and anything < v.” So,
as you said, the two LET-clauses replace the two universal quantifiers
in the natural first-order definition of “prime.” By the way, you don’t
really need that equality is negatable, since you can replace w · v 6= x
with (w · v < x) ∨ (x < w · v).
Q: That’s right. And I don’t really need < since a < b is equivalent to
∃y (a + y + 1 = b). But I wasn’t trying to minimize the vocabulary; I
just wanted to make sure I see how to formalize things in EFPL.
A: OK. Did you notice that, although your formulas define the desired
predicates on all of N, you could have cut off the searches at x, for
5See the proof of Theorem 3 in [1].
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example by adding a conjunct w < x for each ∃w? The resulting finite
searches would still define “prime” correctly.
Q: I thought of that, but I decided the formula was long enough already.
A: In any case, it’s clear that you know what EFPL is; so what’s the
problem with the definition?
Q: I thought I knew EFPL until I saw your extended abstract about
the distributed knowledge authorization language, DKAL [7].
A: That abstract isn’t by the two of us; it’s by one of us and Itay
Neeman.
Q: I know, but Itay isn’t here just now and you are, so I hope you can
clarify the situation for me.
A: We’ll try. What exactly needs to be clarified?
Q: Section 2 of the extended abstract claims to be about existential
fixed-point logic (EFPL), but it looks quite different from the logic that
I learned from your paper [1] and described to you here. In particular,
that section of the abstract hardly mentions quantifiers at all and makes
no distinction between existential and universal quantifiers, whereas
that distinction was crucial in [1].
So I decided to look at the full tech report [6]. Its Section 2 is very
similar to that of the extended abstract. Its Appendix A.3 contains a
quick, prose description of EFPL as defined in [1] but then ignores that
and talks about logic programs and queries instead, just as Section 2
did.
As a result, I’m wondering about the connection between the “logic
programs plus queries” picture in [7, 6] and the traditional picture of
EFPL in [1].
A: The traditional picture in [1] corresponds exactly to the logic pro-
grams aspect described in the DKAL paper [6]. The queries in the
latter paper are outside EFPL, because they include universal quan-
tification, at least in certain circumstances.
When only relational structures are considered, so that logic pro-
grams amount to Datalog, their equivalence with EFPL is in [3]. Grohe
mentioned in the introduction of [5] that it extends to the case of vo-
cabularies that include function symbols.
Q: Is the general case proved there? If not, can you show me in detail
how logic programs correspond to traditional EFPL formulas?
A: We don’t recall seeing a published source for the details of the
correspondence in the general case. First, let’s state the correspondence
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precisely. We deal with structures X for a vocabulary in which all
predicate symbols are negatable. (So positive predicate symbols will
arise only as the P ’s in LET-clauses.)
Theorem 1. The relations definable, in a structure X, by EFPL for-
mulas are the same as the superstrate relations obtained, over the sub-
strate X, by logic programs.
The proof is in two parts, namely translations in both directions be-
tween the two formalisms. Furthermore, the translations are uniform;
that is, they do not depend on the structure X . Incorporating this
uniformity into the statement of the theorem, we have the following
more complete formulation.
Theorem 2. For every EFPL formula ϕ with free variables among
x1, . . . , xn, there is a logic program Π with a distinguished n-ary super-
strate relation P such that, in every structure X, the interpretation of P
defined by Π consists of exactly the n-tuples that satisfy ϕ. Conversely,
given a logic program Π and a distinguished superstrate predicate sym-
bol P , there is an EFPL formula ϕ defining, in every structure X, the
set of n-tuples that Π produces as the interpretation of P .
Q: You said “every structure X” but surely you intended some restric-
tion on the vocabulary of X .
A: You’re right. The vocabulary of X should the same as that of ϕ.
That’s also the substrate vocabulary of Π, while the full vocabulary of
the program Π includes, in addition, P and (possibly) other superstrate
predicate symbols.
3. From Logic Programs to Formulas
A: Let’s begin by considering a logic program of the sort described in
[6]. To recapitulate that description, we have a vocabulary Υ divided
into a substrate part (which may contain relation and function symbols)
and a superstrate part (containing only relation symbols). Substrate
(resp. superstrate) formulas are those whose relation symbols are all
in the substrate (resp. superstrate) part of Υ; note that a superstrate
formula is allowed to contain substrate function symbols.
Q: What’s the intuition behind substrate and superstrate?
A: The idea is that the substrate relations are given to us and the
superstrate relations are computed by means of the program. That
intuition is reflected in the semantics, which we’ll review in a moment,
but first let’s finish the description of the syntax of logic programs.
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A logic rule in the vocabulary Υ has the formH ← B, where the head
H is an atomic superstrate formula and the body B is a conjunction
of atomic superstrate formulas and possibly a quantifier-free substrate
formula. A logic program is a finite set of logic rules.
Semantically, a logic program is to be interpreted in a given structure
X for the substrate vocabulary. It defines interpretations for the super-
strate relations as the least fixed point of all the rules in the program.
That is, interpret each rule
R(t1, . . . , tn)← B
in the program as an instruction to increase the current interpretation
of R by adding all those tuples (a1, . . . , an) of elements of X such that
some assignment of values (in X) to the variables makes B true and
gives each ti the value ai. Formally, this amounts to an operator Γ on
tuples of relations regarded as interpreting all the superstrate relations
(or, equivalently, on Υ-structures whose reduct to the substrate is X).
Repeatedly apply this operator until a fixed point is reached. The
desired interpretations of the superstrate relations constitute the least
(with respect to componentwise inclusion) fixed point of Γ.
Q: This definition reminds me of something else that I wanted to ask
you. In [7], you called this language “liberal Datalog,” but, since you
allow function symbols, it looks to me like pure Prolog. Isn’t the pres-
ence or absence of function symbols the essential difference between
Prolog and (constraint) Datalog?
A: The intended semantics of Prolog uses an Herbrand universe, which
means a structure where every element is denoted by a unique ground
term. The substrate structures of liberal Datalog are quite arbitrary. In
particular, the functions of the structure need not be free constructors.
Q: So liberal Datalog is liberal even when compared to pure Prolog.
A: That’s right.
Now let’s see that the superstrate relations produced, over a sub-
strate X , by a liberal Datalog program can be defined in X by EFPL
formulas in the sense of [1]. In fact, we’ll obtain the required formulas
in a simple, explicit manner from the given program Π.
As a first step, we can rewrite Π so that the head of each rule involves
no function symbols, i.e., each head looks like R(x1, . . . , xn) where the
xi are variables.
Q: This was already explained in [6] in the context of an example, but
the method is clearly general. Given a rule of the form R(t1, . . . , tn)←
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B, where the ti are terms that need not be variables, replace it with
R(x1, . . . , xn)← B ∧
n∧
i=1
(xi = ti)
where the xi are distinct, fresh variables. This modification of Π has
no effect on the operator Γ that it defines, so the superstrate relations
are unchanged.
A: Right. When making these modifications to Π, you can also ar-
range that, if the same relation symbol R occurs in the head of several
rules, then the same tuple of variables x1, . . . , xn is used for all these
occurrences.
At this point, we’ll gradually move from the syntax of logic rules
to the syntax of EFPL. Specifically, we’ll modify the rules of our pro-
gram some more, and the resulting bodies will no longer have the form
required in logic rules but rather will be EFPL formulas.
If several rules in the program begin with the same superstrate sym-
bol R and therefore, by the preceding normalization, have the same
head H , then we combine these rules H ← B1, . . . , H ← Bk into a
single rule
H ← (B1 ∨ · · · ∨Bk).
Q: This use of disjunction was allowed in [6, Appendix A.2.2].
A: Yes, but there it was regarded as syntactic sugar, a mere abbrevi-
ation of the k separate rules H ← Bj. Now, we want to regard it as a
single rule in its own right.
Next, if the body of a rule contains variables other than those in the
head, quantify them existentially. That is, replace R(x1, . . . , xn) ← B
with
R(x1, . . . , xn)← (∃y1) . . . (∃yr)B
where y1, . . . , yr are all the variables in B other than x1, . . . , xn. Is it
clear that this change doesn’t affect the superstrate relations?
Q: Yes. In fact, it doesn’t change the operator Γ used to define those
relations. The essential point is that the definition of Γ was already in
terms of “some assignment.”
A: Good. Notice also that the bodies of our rules, after these modifi-
cations, are still EFPL formulas.
Q: Sure. In fact, they’re in the existential fragment of first-order logic.
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A: Right. Let Π′ be the current, modified program6, let R be a super-
strate relation, say n-ary, and consider the EFPL formula ϕ(x1, . . . , xn)
given by
LET Π′ THEN R(x1, . . . , xn).
Q: Are the variables xi after THEN the same ones that were used with
all occurrences of R in head position in the program?
A: They might as well be, but it doesn’t matter. All variables in the
Π′ part of ϕ are bound, either by the quantifiers that we explicitly
introduced into the bodies of rules or by the “LET . . . THEN” con-
struction. So it doesn’t matter which variables they are. The only
reason we insisted on having the same variables for all occurrences, in
heads, of the same relation symbol is to be able to combine those rules
into a single rule. Thus in Π′ each superstrate relation symbol occurs
in the head of exactly one rule, as required by the syntax of EFPL.
Q: Wait a minute. I see why each superstrate relation symbol occurs
in the head of at most one rule in Π′; if it was originally in more than
one, then you combined those rules using disjunction. But why is it in
exactly one? What if some superstrate symbol doesn’t occur at all?
A: We ignored that situation because such a symbol would be inter-
preted as the empty relation over any substrate, so there’s really no
point in including it in the superstrate. But, to be accurate, we should
cover this case as well, and the disjunction idea still works. So if the
original program had no rules starting with the superstrate symbol R,
then Π′ would have one such rule, R(x1, . . . , xn)← B, where B is the
disjunction of no formulas (the bodies of all the 0 rules with R in the
head). Since the disjunction of no formulas is, by the only reasonable
convention, false, we get the rule R(x1, . . . , xn) ← false, which has
the right semantical effect.
Q: That’s a pretty pedantic answer.
A: It was a pretty pedantic question.
6To agree exactly with the syntax of [1], Π′ should be regarded as a sequence of
rules, rather than a set, by ordering its rules arbitrarily. This pedantry is required
because in [1] we defined the fixed-point construction “LET . . . THEN . . . ” using
sequences between the LET and the THEN. Sequences have the advantage that
formulas are strings of symbols; sets would have the advantage of mathematical
elegance, since the ordering in the sequence never matters. The same comments
apply to logic programs. It is curious that the directly writable, sequence convention
is used in the mathematically oriented paper [1] while the more elegant, abstract,
set convention is used in the application-oriented paper [6].
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Coming back to the EFPL formula ϕ defined above, is it clear that
the relation it defines is exactly the interpretation of the superstrate
relation R that is produced by the original logic program Π?
Q: Almost. It’s clear that, if we interpreted Π′, where it occurs in
ϕ, in the same way that logic programs are interpreted, then it would
produce the same superstrate relations as Π. But the interpretation
of rules, and specifically the operator Γ, is not quite the same in logic
programs as in EFPL. In the semantics of logic programs, the set of
tuples described by a rule is added to the current interpretation of the
relevant superstrate relation symbol. In the semantics of EFPL, the
same set of tuples alone constitutes the new interpretation of that sym-
bol. In other words, the Γ operator for logic programs [6] is explicitly
designed to be inflationary; that of EFPL [1] need not be inflationary.
A: That is true, but it doesn’t matter. A not-necessarily-inflationary
operator ∆ and its explicitly inflationary variant Γ defined by Γ(A) =
∆(A) ∪ A have the same closed points.
Q: What do you mean by closed points?
A: A closed point of Γ is an A such that Γ(A) ⊆ A. It’s fairly common
terminology to say that a set is closed under an operator. We say
“closed point” rather than “closed set” because, when there are several
superstrate predicate symbols, our operators act on tuples of relations,
not on single sets.
Coming back to the situation of an operator ∆ and its inflationary
variant Γ, it’s clear that they have the same closed points. For any
monotone operator, the least fixed point is also the least closed point.
And our operators are monotone, because superstrate relations occur
only positively in the bodies of logic programs (even after we modify
the programs as above). So Γ and ∆ have the same least fixed point.
Q: OK. Actually, I now see another reason why we can ignore the
inflationary aspect of the Γ in [6]. If we think of the least fixed point of
a monotone operator ∆ as being constructed by iterating ∆, then the
sequence of iterates is non-decreasing. So, for every A in this sequence,
∆(A) = Γ(A).
A: Right. So this completes the proof that the superstrate relations
defined, over a given substrate structure X , by a logic program Π, as
in [6], are also defined over X by EFPL formulas ϕ. Furthermore, the
transformation of Π into ϕ is uniform, i.e., the same for all X .
Q: Yes. In fact it proves a bit more, namely that any logic program
can be translated into EFPL formulas of a rather special form: A
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single LET . . . THEN construct, where the part after THEN is an
atomic formula consisting of a relation symbol followed by variables.
Furthermore, the bodies of the inductive definitions (rules) after LET
are existential first-order formulas.
That worries me, because for the other half of the equivalence be-
tween logic programs and EFPL, you’ll have to find logic programs
equivalent to arbitrary EFPL formulas, not just those of this special
form.
A: That’s right, but you needn’t worry. Every EFPL formula is equiv-
alent to one in this special form, and the equivalence to logic programs
is one way to prove this.
4. From Formulas to Logic Programs
A: Given an arbitrary EFPL formula ϕ(u1, . . . , un) with free variables
among those indicated, we shall transform it into a logic program Π
such that a particular n-ary superstrate relation, as defined by Π over
any substrate X , is the set of n-tuples that satisfy ϕ in X . That
will complete the proof that logic programs and EFPL formulas are
equivalent; they can be regarded as two ways of presenting the same
logic.
As a first step, we’ll show that every EFPL formula is logically equiv-
alent to one of the special form
LET P1(~x
1)← δ1, . . . , Pk(~x
k)← δk THEN ψ
where all the formulas δi and ψ are existential first-order formulas and
where the free variables of any δi are among the variables ~x
i serving as
the arguments of the corresponding Pi in the definition Pi(~x
i)← δi.
Q: Since “LET . . . THEN” binds these ~xis, the only free variables in
such a formula are those in ψ.
A: Right; that will simplify part of the proof. We should also mention
that k = 0 is allowed; then the formula above amounts to just ψ.
Q: I bet your proof that all EFPL formulas are equivalent to ones of this
special form is an induction on formulas, and by allowing k = 0 you’ve
made the cases of atomic formulas and of negated atomic formulas
trivial (whereas otherwise they would only have been obvious).
A: Right on both counts. Conjunction and disjunction are also easy.
Given two formulas in the desired form, rename the bound predicate
variables of the LET-clause — the Pi’s in the notation above — in one
of them so as to be distinct from those of the other formula. Then just
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combine their LET-clauses and form the conjunction or disjunction of
the THEN-clauses.
Existential quantification is even easier. Leave the LET-clause alone
and quantify the THEN-clause.
Q: This simple argument for the existential quantifier case makes use
of your convention that the only free variables in δi are among the ~x
i.
Without this convention, you’d have to consider the possibility that
some other variable free in some δi is being quantified.
But, in keeping with the principle that there’s no free lunch, it seems
that you’ll have to pay for this convention in the one remaining case of
your induction. Given a LET-THEN formula, you’ll have to get rid of
any extraneous free variables in its LET-clause.
A: You’re right, but in this case the lunch is fairly cheap.
Suppose we’re given a formula LET P (x)← δ THEN ψ where both
δ and ψ are of the desired form.
Q: Wait a minute. Are you assuming that there’s only one constituent
P (x)← δ in the LET part and that P is unary?
A: Yes, but this is only for notational simplicity.7 The general case
would involve a lot of subscripts but no new ideas. Notice, in particular,
that if we have several P ’s with their corresponding δ’s, and if each δ
has a LET-clause with several consitituents, defining predicates Q, then
each of those Q’s needs two subscripts — the first to tell which δ it’s
in and the second to tell where it is in that δ’s LET-clause — and the
range of the second subscript depends on the first. Subscript-juggling
in such a case tends to obscure the proof.
Q: OK, go ahead with your “one unary predicate” proof. Maybe af-
terward I’ll figure out all the subscripts for the general case on my
own.
A: Let’s start by taking our formula,
LET P (x)← δ THEN ψ,
and showing how to eliminate any extraneous free variables from δ.
Continuing to avoid uninformative subscripts, let’s suppose y is the
7It is also known that, at least in the presence of two constant symbols, simul-
taneous positive recursions can be reduced to a single positive recursion, albeit for
a relation of higher arity. See [9, Theorem 1C.1]. The context in [9] is positive
recursion over full first-order logic, but universal quantification isn’t used for this
theorem.
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only variable other than x that is free in δ. Then we claim our formula
is equivalent to
LET P ′(x, y)← δ′ THEN ψ′,
where δ′ and ψ′ are obtained from δ and ψ by replacing each atomic
subformula of the form P (t) with P ′(t, y). (Of course, we assume that
bound variables in δ and ψ have been renamed if necessary so that the
y’s introduced here don’t become accidentally bound.)
To see that the new formula is equivalent to the original, consider the
binary relation obtained as (the interpretation of) P ′ from the recursion
P ′(x, y) ← δ′. If you fix any particular value b ∈ X for y, then the
resulting unary relation, P ′(x, b) is exactly the relation defined by the
original clause, P (x)← δ with y assigned the value b.
Q: Yes, that’s easy to see if you think of the iterative process leading to
the fixed points that interpret P and P ′. In the new clause, P ′(x, y)←
δ′, y behaves simply as a parameter. So, as the binary relation defined
by this clause grows, from∅ toward the fixed point P ′, its unary section
obtained by fixing the second argument as b grows exactly according
to the original clause P (x) ← δ with y denoting b. In particular, the
agreement between P and a section of P ′ occurs not only for the final
fixed points but stage by stage during the iteration.
A: That’s right. But one can also verify the final agreement directly
in terms of least fixed points without referring to the iteration. If P ′ is
the least fixed point of the new iteration, then each of its sections, say
at b, is the least fixed point of the old iteration with y denoting b.
Q: I see that the section is a fixed point of the old operator, simply
because P ′ itself is a fixed point of the new one, but why is it the least
fixed point?
A: If you had a smaller fixed point P− for the old operator, then you
could replace the b section of P ′ with P− while leaving all the other
sections unchanged. The result would be a smaller fixed point than P ′
for the new operator. The point here is that we can modify a single
section independently of the others because the new operator works on
each section separately.
Q: I see; this is what I expressed earlier by saying that y behaves simply
as a parameter.
OK, so you can get rid of extraneous free variables in δ. But your
unary P has become a binary P ′.
A: It’s still the case that higher arities (or more P ’s) contribute only
notational complications. So, if you don’t mind, we’ll revert to the
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unary notation and we’ll drop the primes on P , δ, and σ. In other
words, we’ll return to the original notation LET P (x) ← δ THEN ψ
but with the assumption that only x is free in δ.
Q: OK; I never was a big fan of subscripts.
A: Good. So let’s consider this formula ϕ:
LET P (x)← δ THEN ψ.
By induction hypothesis, we know that δ and ψ are already of the
desired form, say δ is
LET R(y)← ρ THEN π,
and ψ is
LET S(z)← σ THEN θ,
where ρ, π, σ, θ are existential first-order formulas, and their free vari-
ables are among those indicated here:
ρ(y), π(x), σ(z), θ(u).
Q: What’s this u? It wasn’t in any of the previous formulas.
A: u represents whatever variables are free in the whole formula ϕ.
They were called u1, . . . , un at the beginning of this half of the proof,
but, as usual, we now pretend, for notational simplicity, that there’s
only one such variable.
Q: OK. All your other limitations on free variables are based on the fact
that, by induction hypothesis and by the preceding discussion, none of
the three LET-clauses have extraneous free variables. In particular,
any variable free in π would also be free in δ and therefore can only be
x.
A: That’s right. Let’s write out ϕ in detail, exhibiting not only the
free variables in each part (as above) but also the predicate variables,
P,R, S, that could occur in each part. So ϕ looks like
LET P (x)← [LET R(y)← ρ(P,R, y) THEN π(P,R, x)]
THEN [LET S(z)← σ(P, S, z) THEN θ(P, S, u)].
Q: Please wait a minute while I check your claims about which predi-
cates can occur where. . . . OK, I agree with what you wrote. The point
is that the predicate variable introduced before a ← in a LET-clause
is allowed to occur at the right of that ← in that LET-clause and also
in the associated THEN-clause but not elsewhere.
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A: Right. Now we claim that ϕ is equivalent to the following formula
ϕ′:
LET P (x)← π(P,R, x), R(y)← ρ(P,R, y), S(z)← σ(P, S, z)
THEN θ(P, S, u).
Q: Essentially, you’ve just lumped together all the LET-clauses in ϕ,
ignoring the nesting of the clause for R inside the clause for P , and
made one big LET-clause out of all of them. Not very subtle.
A: But it works. The first step toward the proof that it works is setting
up some notation that is neither cumbersome nor ambiguous. (Either
problem alone is easily avoided.) We propose the following.
Fix a structure and a value for the free variable u of ϕ. Since they’re
fixed, we won’t mention them in our notation. To further simplify
the notation, we’ll generally use the same symbols for syntactic enti-
ties (like the predicates P,R, S and the variables x, y, z) and possible
semantic interpretations of them in our structure.
Now let’s look at our formula ϕ and set up some notation for the
various fixed points that occur in it. We begin with the LET-clause
R(y)← ρ(P,R, y) that defines the fixed-point interpretation for R.
Q: Why not start with the first LET-clause, the one for P ?
A: The defining formula δ in that clause involves the fixed point for
the R clause, so it’s useful to settle the R part of the notation first.
For any particular interpretation of the predicate P — and, as indi-
cated above, we’ll use the same symbol P for the interpretation — ρ
defines a least fixed point that we’ll call R∞(P ).
Next, the LET-clause for P amounts to using the definition π(P,R, x)
but with R interpreted as R∞(P ). (Indeed, that’s the semantics of
“LET R(y) ← ρ(P,R, y) THEN π(P,R, x).”) Note carefully that the
monotone operator described by this clause,
P 7→ {x : π(P,R∞(P ), x)}
uses its input P twice — first in the first argument of π and again via
the dependence on P of the second argument R∞(P ). We denote the
least fixed point of this operator by P∞.
Similarly, the LET-clause for S uses the definition σ(P, S, z) with
P interpreted as P∞. We write S∞ for the least fixed point of this
operator.
Next, we need notation for the three predicates obtained as the least
fixed point of the simultaneous recursion in ϕ′. Having already used
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superscripts ∞ for another purpose, we’ll use stars instead for this
triple of fixed points, calling them P ∗, Q∗, R∗.
In connection with all these fixed points, it is useful to remember
that the least fixed point is also the least closed point. Thus, for
example, P ∗, Q∗, R∗ can be characterized as the smallest relations that
simultaneously satisfy the implications
∀x [π(P ∗, R∗, x) =⇒ P ∗(x)](1)
∀y [ρ(P ∗, R∗, y) =⇒ R∗(y)](2)
∀z [σ(P ∗, S∗, z) =⇒ S∗(z)](3)
(whereas for fixed points we’d write bi-implications).
The essence of the proof is to show that the fixed points arising from
ϕ and from ϕ′ match as follows.
P ∗ = P∞, R∗ = R∞(P ∗), and S∗ = S∞.
Q: It’s clear that, once you establish these equations, you’re done.
After all the truth value of ϕ is, by definition, obtained by evaluating
θ with P and S interpreted as P∞ and S∞, while the truth value of ϕ′
is obtained by evaluating the same θ (in the same structure with the
same value for u, as fixed earlier) with P and S interpreted as P ∗ and
S∗. In fact, this last part of the proof won’t need the equation for R,
with its curious mixture of∞ and ∗ on the right side; presumably that
equation is needed as an intermediate step in the proof of the other
two equations.
So please go ahead and prove the ∗ =∞ equations.
A: OK. We’ll start by showing that R∗ = R∞(P ∗). Formula (2) says
exactly that R∗ is a closed point of the operator R 7→ {y : ρ(P ∗, R, y)}.
According to the definition of R∞(P ), applied with P instantiated as
P ∗, the least closed point of this operator is R∞(P ∗). So we immedi-
ately have that R∞(P ∗) ⊆ R∗.
Furthermore, all three of the formulas (1), (2), and (3) remain true
if we replace R∗ by R∞(P ∗). For (1), this follows from the fact that
R is a positive predicate symbol (otherwise it couldn’t have occurred
on the left of ← in ϕ) and so π is monotone with respect to R. When
we replace R∗ by R∞(P ∗), the interpretation of R can only decrease.
That strengthens the antecedent in (1) and thus preserves the truth
of (1). The argument for (2) is easier; the result of replacing R∗ by
R∞(P ∗) there is just the fact that R∞(P ∗) is by definition closed under
the operator defined by π with P interpreted as P ∗. Finally, the case
of (3) is trivial, as R∗ doesn’t occur there.
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Thus, the triple P ∗, R∞(P ∗), S∗ is closed under the simultaneous
recursive operator whose least closed point is P ∗, R∗, S∗. Therefore
R∗ ⊆ R∞(P ∗), and the ∗ =∞ equation for R is proved.
Let’s turn next to the equation for P . In view of what we’ve already
proved, formula (1) can be written as
∀x [π(P ∗, R∞(P ∗), x) =⇒ P ∗(x)],
which says that P ∗ is closed under the operator P 7→ {x : π(P,R∞(P ), x)},
whose least closed point is P∞. So we have P∞ ⊆ P ∗.
Furthermore, all three of the formulas (1), (2), and (3) remain true
if we replace P ∗ by P∞ and replace R∗ by R∞(P∞). In the case of (1),
this is just the closure condition defining P∞. In the case of (2), it’s the
closure condition defining R∞(P∞). And in the case of (3), it follows
from the facts that σ is monotone with respect to P and P∞ ⊆ P ∗.
Thus, the triple P∞, R∞(P∞), S∗ is closed under the simultaneous
recursive operator whose least closed point is P ∗, R∗, S∗. Therefore
P ∗ ⊆ P∞, and the ∗ =∞ equation for P is proved.
Finally, we turn to S. In view of the equations already proved,
formula (3) is equivalent to
∀z [σ(P∞, S∗, z) =⇒ S∗(z)],
which says that S∗ is closed under the operator whose least closed point
is S∞. Therefore, S∞ ⊆ S∗.
Furthermore, all three of the formulas (1), (2), and (3) remain true if
we replace P ∗ by P∞, R∗ by R∞(P∞), and S∗ by S∞. Since S∗ doesn’t
occur in (1) and (2), the argument given for them above still applies.
As for (3), the formula we get is just the closure requirement in the
definition of S∞.
Thus, the triple P∞, R∞(P∞), S∞ is closed under the simultaneous
recursive operator whose least closed point is P ∗, R∗, S∗. Therefore,
S∗ ⊆ S∞, and so the proof is complete.
Q: You mean the proof of the ∗ = ∞ equations. So you’ve com-
pleted the inductive proof that every EFPL formula can be put into
the normal form LET P (x)← δ THEN ψ, with δ and ψ in existential
first-order logic. And you have the additional normalization that δ has
no free variables but x (except that you might really have lots of P ’s
of arbitrary arities). You still have to convert this into a logic program
of the form used in [6].
A: Right, but the rest is fairly easy.
First, we can arrange that the formula ψ after “THEN” is an atomic
formula Q(~u) where ~u is a tuple of distinct variables (not compound
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terms). Indeed, if we let ~u list all the variables free in the given formula
LET P (x) ← δ THEN ψ (hence free in ψ) and if we let Q be a new,
positive predicate symbol of the right arity, then this given formula is
easily equivalent to
LET P (x)← δ, Q(~u)← ψ THEN Q(~u).
Q: I see: Since Q doesn’t occur in ψ, the “recursive” definition Q(~u)←
ψ isn’t really recursive. The relevant iteration takes just one step (once
P has reached its fixed point) and, in effect, makes Q(~u) an alias for
ψ.
A: Right. Furthermore, as Q doesn’t occur in δ, nothing has changed
in the recursive definition of P .
So our formula has been equivalently rewritten as
LET P1(~x
1)← δ1, . . . , Pk(~x
k)← δk THEN Pk(~u).
Q: You must really be getting near the end of the proof, since you’ve
restored the multiple P ’s and their subscripts.
A: Yes. What remains is to transform each of the existential first-order
formulas δi as follows.
We can put each δi into prenex form and then put its quantifier-free
matrix into disjunctive normal form. So δi now looks like
∃~yi
∨
r
∧
s
αi,r,s(~x
i, ~yi),
where the α’s are atomic or negated atomic formulas.
Then the required logic program Π consists of the rules
Pi(~x
i)←
∧
s
αi,r,s(~x
i, ~yi),
one for each i and r.
Q: This is very similar to what happened in the first part of the proof,
translating logic programs into EFPL formulas. The monotone op-
erators defined by the transformed EFPL formula and by the logic
program are identical as operators. So they certainly have the same
least fixed point. In particular, the Pk component of that least fixed
point, which is one of the superstrate relations defined by the program,
is the interpretation, in the substrate, of the original EFPL formula.
Remark 3. Although, as mentioned in a footnote earlier, [6] is directed
toward applications and [1] is more theoretical, EFPL does have one ad-
vantage over liberal Datalog from the programming point of view. In
a liberal Datalog program, all variables are global, but in an EFPL
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formula, the LET-THEN construction provides local variables with
scopes. The latter can be important for large-scale programming, by
making it easy to assemble small modules into a large program (or
formula).
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